A terrorist cell was recently exposed in Bahrain which planned to attack Bahraini and Saudi Arabian targets. The attacks, attributed by the Bahraini and Saudi media to Iran, may be part of a terrorist campaign waged by Iran against Saudi Arabia and its allies.

The King Fahd Causeway connecting Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, an important strategic route linking the two countries (Picture from Wikipedia). The terrorist cell exposed in Bahrain was planning to sabotage the bridge.
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Bahrain is a small, predominantly Shi’ite island country ruled by a Sunni royal family. Its proximity to Iran and basic political-societal environment have made it an attractive target for Iranian subversion.
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Exposure of the terrorist cell in Bahrain which planned a series of attacks in Bahrain, handled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards
1. A terrorist cell was recently exposed in Bahrain, which according to the Bahraini and Saudi media, was run by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The cell planned to attack the following targets:
1) The King Fahd Causeway linking Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.
2) The Saudi embassy in Bahrain.
3) The Bahraini ministry of the interior
2. Saudi and Arab media accused the Iranian Revolutionary Guards of running the terrorist cell. On November 14, 2011 the Saudi paper Okaz reported that the cell operatives admitted that members of the Revolutionary Guards were behind the plot to blow up the Saudi embassy and the King Fahd Causeway.

The King Fahd Causeway linking Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (Arabwebpaper.com website)
3. General Tariq al-Hassan, spokesman for Bahrain’s ministry of the interior, said that four of the cell’s operatives had been detained in Qatar and deported to Bahrain on November 4, 2011. The fifth operative was detained in Bahrain. According to al-Hassan, the four who were detained in Qatar arrived there from Saudi Arabia. They were found to be carrying documents and a computer containing security information and details about several vital targets. Dollars and Iranian rials were also found in their possession. Under interrogation they confessed to leaving Bahrain illegally and going to Iran to establish an organization which would carry out terrorist attacks in Bahrain (Agence France-Presse, date, 2011).
4. Members of the Bahraini parliament said that the “terrorist plot” exposed was not directed only against Bahrain but intended to attack the Arab identity of the the Gulf States. They thanked Qatar for helping them expose the cell and demanded greater inspection and supervision of the border crossings on land, at sea and in the air to prevent terrorist cells from entering Bahrain. They noted that an attack on the King Fahd Causeway the terrorist operatives would cut off the land connection between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, creating a focal point of tension. Members of the Bahraini parliament also accused the Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah of having ties to the cell; Hezbollah issued a sweeping denial of the allegations (Intiqad website, November 15, 2011).1
5. Following the exposure of the cell, the Saudi media savagely attacked Iran, claiming that the “threads of the conspiracy” led to

The article in the Saudi daily newspaper Al-Riyadh.
The headline reads “Iran is a terrorist state” (Alriyadh.com).
6. On the practical level, it was reported that the Saudi security authorities were planning to appoint a special task force to protect Saudi diplomats and a unit to secure the King Fahd Causeway (Al-Hayat, November 15 and 16, 2011). The role of the task force would reportedly be to protect Saudi ambassadors around the world, Saudi diplomatic delegations abroad and foreign diplomats serving in Saudi Arabia. The force would be composed of commandos, supervised by the general security service and subordinate to the ministry of the interior (Daralhayat.com website).
Background and significance
7. The series of terrorist attacks prevented in Bahrain were part of an Iranian campaign against Saudi Arabia and its allies. The campaign is several months old and makes use of a variety of tactics, including personal attacks targeting Saudi diplomats, subversion and propaganda. The concrete motive and catalyst for the campaign were, in our assessment, the entrance of Saudi forces into Bahrain under the flag of the Gulf Cooperation Council on March 14, 2011, and the containment of the Shi’ite protests in Bahrain. The protests, influenced by the current general regional instability, demanded that King Hamad al-Khalifa carry out a series of social and political reforms. In our assessment, the events marked Saudi Arabia as leading a campaign in Bahrain and the Persian Gulf against Iran, and in retaliation Iran is using the Quds Force to punish both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

The forces of the Gulf Cooperation Council enter Bahrain (Presstv.ir website)
8. Iran initiated two other attacks against Saudi Arabia in the recent past.
1) An attempt on the life of Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi ambassador to the United States, was prevented: On September 29, 2011, American security forces detained a man with dual American-Iranian citizenship working for the Quds Force. His Quds Force handler successfully fled to Iran. According to the American administration, top figures in the Iranian regime were involved in the plot, as part of what was referred to as Iran’s “reckless and dangerous” behavior. Following the exposure of the plot the
United States initiated a series of diplomatic and practical steps against Iran.2
2) The killing of a Saudi diplomate in Pakistan:
A. On May 16, 2011, Hassan al-Khatani, a security officer with the Saudi delegation in Karachi was shot dead in his car by two men riding a motorbike who fired four rounds. Four days previously two hand grenades were thrown at the front gate of the consulate (The Guardian, May 16, 2011). Saudi and American sources believe that the Iranian Quds Force was behind the attacks (Washington Post, October 13, 2011).
B. According to a November 22 posting on the Dar al-Hayat website, the Pakistani security services solved both cases following the detention of an armed cell belonging to a Shi’ite organization called Jaish-e-Mohammed (the army of Muhammad), outlawed in Pakistan. According to the posting, which relied on Pakistani sources, the organization receives support and military training from Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah operatives. The cell members confessed to having committed a number of terrorist attacks including shooting at the Saudi consulate a number of days before the killing of the Saudi diplomat.
9. Iran’s subversive and terrorist activity against Saudi Arabia and its allies was accompanied, as usual, by a wave of propaganda and displays in the Persian Gulf:
1) The Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, secretary of the Iranian Guardian Council, was severely critical of the involvement of the forces of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Gulf of Bahrain (Bahrain News Agency, July 18, 2011). In response the Council sent an official communiqué referring to Jannati’s remarks as “provocative” and calling them unwanted intervention in Bahrain’s internal affairs. Iran responded with its own communiqué rejecting that of the Council (Fars News Agency, Iran, July 21, 2011).3
2) Iran’s Mehr News Agency was severely critical of Saudi policy toward the country’s Shi’ites. It claimed that even the Western media compared the oppression and discrimination against the Shi’ites in eastern Saudi Arabia to South Africa’s apartheid policies (Mehr News Agency, Iran, October 14, 2011). Continue reading →