Is North Korea Making EMP Weapons?

Electromagnetic Pulse (Photo credit: arbyreed)

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InnovationNewsDaily Staff

North Korea may be developing electromagnetic pulse weapons or bombs that could take out power grids — not to mention military and civilian electronics.

Such speculation comes from a Chinese military analyst’s article in the journal Bauhinia, according to the Washington Times. The Chinese military pointed out that North Korea has always planned to develop small nuclear weapons capable of creating such electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) — likely targeted at South Korean and U.S. military forces based in the southern half of the Korean peninsula.

The possibility of using EMPs as a weapon arose during early days of U.S. and Soviet nuclear testing during the Cold War. Nuclear blasts from those tests created EMPs as a secondary effect that led to some unexpected damage for civilian power grids and facilities.

Several countries, such as the U.S., have also investigated the possibility of making EMP weapons that don’t require nuclear blasts. But North Korea’s weapon-making efforts have recently focused upon expanding its nuclear arsenal.

Gangsters, Islamic Terrorists, Deathmatch

English: The Muslim population of the world map by percentage of each country, according to the Pew Forum 2009 report on world Muslim populations. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

June 17, 2012: The continuing violence in the Moslem south has led to 5,000 dead and 8,000 wounded in the last eight years. But it has also led to over 200,000 people leaving the area. Most of those fleeing have been Moslem. About 30 percent of the Buddhists in the south (who were 20 percent of the population in 2004) have fled and ten percent of the Moslems. Criminal gangs, whose main business is smuggling drugs and other contraband from Malaysia, have long dominated the area. The gangs agreed to support the Islamic terrorists, since both groups had something to gain by trying to weaken law and order in the area. While the gangs made it more difficult to improve the economy, they were more tolerable than the Islamic terrorists. All this has become too much for most Moslems. The Islamic terrorists wanted to expel all non-Moslems, shut down secular schools, and didn’t care if they made it difficult to improve the economy. This was too much for most of the Moslems the Islamic terrorists were supposed to be representing. Those that don’t flee are increasingly joining pro-government armed defense groups. The gangs and Islamic terror groups refuse to negotiate or quit, so it’s a fight to the death. The gangs will probably turn on their Islamic radical allies eventually, as the criminal organizations are not run by religious fanatics but business-minded entrepreneurs who are not keen on getting wiped out. Then again, the gangsters believe that the Islamic radicals will have to be killed, otherwise the southern gangsters will have some pretty deadly and determined enemies in their own backyard.

‘Terrorism in Asia can be only prevented by SCO members’

An interview with Viktor Nadein-Rayevsky, Institute of World Economy & International Relations, Moscow

Thu Jun 7, 2012 4:6PM GMT

That is important that there have been several military exercises that give opportunity for joint operations here in Central Asia. Of course, this organization is the only real mechanism that can help stop terrorist activities here. It is a problem of course and this problem is on the way of solution.”

Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has lashed out at NATO‘s eastward expansion, saying it’s aimed at stopping the growth of the member states of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

 

Ahmadinejad said NATO members are trying to resurrect what he called past colonialist relations, adding “the colonialists are equally opposed to the development of China, Russia, India and Iran as well as other members of the SCO.”

He further called for a new world order, saying the current one has failed because of its “inhumane and unfair nature.”

The SCO is an intergovernmental organization that was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Iran, India, Mongolia, Afghanistan and Pakistan are observer members of the organization.

Press TV has conducted an interview with Viktor Nadein-Rayevsky from Moscow’s Institute of World Economy & International Relations to further discuss the issue. The following is a rough transcription of the interview.

 

Press TV:Nadein-Rayevsky, tell us what you think about the declaration especially the fact that it seems very firm regarding the expansion of the Western countries, in particular the United States, as they have said with the concentration in the Asia-Pacific.

Nadein-Rayevsky:In fact, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the last years has become a rather prominent and important partner of many international organizations in the world.

First of all, that was very important that it begins the cooperation from real problems; problems that are dangerous for all the countries of the region. First of all, there is the problem of terrorism and, of course, the problems of separatism and drug trafficking which are very dangerous things the countries of the region have to deal with.

Sri Lanka: Reactions to US Resolution at UNHRC

Filed under: Global Voices by Rezwan on Thursday, 12 April 2012

Image by indi/Flickr.

On 22 March, 2012, 24 countries voted in favour of a US resolution at a UN Human Rights Council meeting on Sri Lanka seeking to encourage the government to implement the recommendations made by the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) and also to credibly investigate allegations of human rights violations during the country’s long lasting civil war against the LTTE.

The move was vehemently opposed by Sri Lanka right from the start and the netizens also voiced their opinions.

Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka at Groundviews called the US resolution a big lie:

“One of the rankest untruths in the public domain today is that the US resolution is innocuous and unobjectionable because it only seeks to commit the government of Sri Lanka to implement its own LLRC report within a reasonable time frame.”

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW-Volume 10, No. 40, April 9, 2012

Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 40, April 9, 2012

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal ASSESSMENT PAKISTAN: Gilgit-Baltistan: Orchestrated Strife - Ajit Kumar Singh PAKISTAN: Terror by Abduction - Ambreen Agha PAKISTAN Gilgit-Baltistan: Orchestrated Strife Ajit Kumar Singh Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) has been an area of enduring darkness and oppression since its occupation in 1948, in the wake of India’s bloody Partition, and is, again, reeling under a renewed cycle of acute violence. The current troubles commenced with the killing of 18 Shias in the Kohistan area of neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) on February 28, 2012, and took an uglier turn on April 3, 2012. At least 24 people have died and several others have been injured, in incidents across GB, since the morning of April 3 (till the time of writing). Unconfirmed reports put the number of dead at more than 250. Giving his account of the escalation, GB Police officer Basharat Ali noted that the violence within the region commenced on April 3, when five persons were killed in Gilgit city in clashes between the Police and protesting cadres and sympathizers of the recently banned Sunni formation, Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), a reincarnation of the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The outfit had called for a strike in Gilgit, to press the Government to release its ‘deputy secretary general’, Maulana Ataullah Sadiq, who was arrested on March 28, 2012, in connection with firing on a Shia procession on March 4, 2012. The March 4 procession had been organized to protest against the February 28, 2012, Kohistan killings. On April 3, angry protesters burnt tyres and forced shopkeepers to shut down their shops. Meanwhile, an unidentified person hurled a grenade at the protesting ASWJ cadres, killing at least seven protestors. Subsequently, mosques in the Kashroot area of Gilgit made announcements to retaliate against the Shias in the Diamer District of GB and the Kohistan District of KP. Unsurprisingly, 12 Shias were killed when unidentified assailants opened fire on buses on Karakoram Highway (KKH) near Gonar Farm in Chilas, headquarter of Diamer District, on April 3. According to eye witnesses, miscreants also set ablaze four buses. In a number of attacks on public transports, some 300 passengers were reported missing, and their whereabouts are yet to be ascertained. Fresh lashkars (armed groups) were reported to have embarked from the Chilas, Diamer and Kohistan areas towards Gilgit and its outskirts, to take the ‘revenge’ for the grenade attack on the ASWJ protestors, but were prevented from entering the town by locals in the outlying villages.

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 39, April 2, 2012

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal ASSESSMENT · INDIA: Maoists: Enduring Strengths - Ajai Sahni · INDIA-SRI LANKA: Disgrace - Ajai Sahni INDIA Maoists: Enduring Strengths Ajai Sahni Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management & SATP In quick succession, three disruptive incidents have shocked India out of the complacency that had set in, as the policy establishment celebrated sharp declines in violence and fatalities engineered by the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist), over the past year. The worst of these incidents was, of course, the March 27, 2012, improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) transport at Pustola in Gadchiroli District, Maharashtra, which killed 12 and injured 28. In their enthusiasm during CRPF Director General Vijay Kumar’s visit to Fulbodi Gatta to inspect a Community Outreach Programme, the troopers had ignored standard operating procedures (SOPs), driving over a road that had not been sanitized in advance. The Maoists were quick to take bloody advantage. A loss of lives among SF personnel, however, is easily ignored and quickly forgotten by the Indian state. The abduction of foreigners and the inevitable international media carnival that follows, tends to be far more embarrassing, for much longer, especially when the ‘hostage drama’ extends over weeks. The ‘arrest’ as the Maoists chose to describe it, of two Italians – a tourist and a tour operator – on March 14, 2012, in the Daringbadi Block of Kandhamal District, Odisha, has, consequently, shattered the illusion of an ‘improved internal security situation’ to a far greater extent. While one of the hostages, Claudio Colangelo, was released on March 25, 2012, the second, tour operator Paulo Basusco, continues to be held hostage by the rebels at the time of writing. The abduction occurred while the Italians were moving in areas of Maoist influence, officials claim, against the advice of the administration. Even as the Italian hostage drama was being played out, a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), tribal leader Jhina Hikaka, from the ruling Biju Janata Dal (BJD), was abducted on March 24, 2012, near Laxmipur in Koraput District, Odisha, when he chose to ignore security procedures, to travel through Maoist dominated territories from Semilguda to his constituency, Laxmipur. Hikaka’s vehicle was stopped near Toyaput, and he was abducted after he identified himself. The Basusco and Hikaka abductions remain unresolved at the time of writing. Crucially, all three actions were incidents of opportunity, reflecting enduring Maoist capacities, rather than strategic intent or planning, and demonstrating quite clearly that a decline in fatalities is not synonymous with a decline in rebel capacities or with an improvement in the ‘security situation’. Indeed, despite the significant reverses inflicted on the Maoists, especially at the leadership level, as well as some contraction in their areas of operation, the rebels’ disruptive capabilities in their core areas along the purported ‘Red Corridor’, remain substantially intact.

Pakistan Security Brief – March 28, 2012

Map of Pakistan (Photo credit: Omer Wazir)

Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff to meet U.S. Generals to discuss November NATO incident; Pakistani opposition leaders resistant to recommendations on U.S.-Pakistan relations; Rep. Dana Rohrabacher alleges that Pakistan has “radical Islam[ist]” government; Two major U.S. oil companies interested in TAPI pipeline; German embassy employee found dead in Islamabad; Unidentified assailants blow up gas pipeline in Peshawar; German-Afghan man on trial for being part of al Qaeda claims innocence; Indian Prime Minister meets with Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani; Leaked letter describes weaknesses in Indian military; Delegation of Pakistani defense and security officials meet with French counterparts; Pakistan’s Supreme Court to hear Hussain Haqqani’s petition to record his statement via video link; Yemen urges Pakistan to release Osama bin Laden’s widow and children.

U.S.-Pakistan Relations

• The Pakistani military announced that Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani will meet with CENTCOM Commander General James Mattis and U.S. Commander in Afghanistan General John Allen in Islamabad on Wednesday to discuss the November 26 incident in which NATO forces killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. According to a senior Pakistani military official, the meeting will also “look at border security and coordination measures and how to improve them.”[1]
• Pakistani opposition leaders were resistant to the Parliamentary Committee on National Security’s (PCNS) recommendations on U.S.-Pakistan relations during Tuesday’s proceedings of the joint session of Parliament. Opposition Leader Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan pointed to a clause that called for bringing to justice those responsible for the November cross-border attack, and said that since the U.S. has refused to even admit that it was at fault in this instance, there would be no use in passing such recommendations. Chief of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) Maulana Fazlur Rehman warned that if the government passed any resolution unilaterally, the JUI-F would not let it be implemented. Rehman added that making the reopening of NATO supply routes conditional on a U.S. apology was the “easy way out,” because the U.S. “would do whatever it takes to serve its purpose.” Senator Rabbani attempted to alleviate the opposition’s concerns by reminding them that the government would not have closed the NATO supply routes and had the Shamsi airbase vacated “if it wanted to satisfy the [U.S.]”[2]
• According to a senior advisor to the Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy in the U.S., two “major [U.S.] oil companies are interested” in the Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan India (TAPI) pipeline. The proposed pipeline is expected to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan’s gas fields through Afghanistan into Pakistan and then finally to India. The governments of the four countries are planning to finalize the TAPI pipeline deal by July 31, 2012.[3]
• Three U.S. Congressmen, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, Rep. Louie Gohmert and Rep. Steve King, sought “self-determination” for the “oppressed” people of Balochistan at a news conference held at the National Press Club on Tuesday. Rohrabacher alleged that Pakistan has a “radical Islam[ist]” government that has been “providing weapons and resources to radical Muslim elements” who use them against the U.S. He added that Pakistan is not a friend of the U.S., but is “really our enemy.”[4]

Militancy

• The Express Tribune reported on Wednesday that police recovered the bodies of a German embassy employee and one other unidentified person from Rawal Dam in Islamabad. The employee, Fayaz Ali, had been reported missing by his family on March 22. According to investigators, the dead bodies were four to five days old, but investigators have still not determined if the two men were murdered.[5]
• Unidentified assailants blew up a gas pipeline on the Ring Road in Peshawar on Wednesday morning. No casualties were reported from the explosion.[6]
• A German-Afghan man on trial in a German state court for providing funds to al Qaeda claimed on Tuesday that the funds were not intended for terrorism. Ahmad Wali Siddiqui had previously told the court that he lived in an apartment in Pakistan near the Afghan border that was provided by al Qaeda, but he was not an al Qaeda member. On Tuesday, Siddiqui testified that he transferred money from Hamburg to an al Qaeda contact in Pakistan in 2010, but he said that he never saw the money again and that it was intended for his own expenses.[7]
• A policeman was killed and another was injured when unknown gunmen opened fire on the home of a Shariat Court judge in the Mumtazabad area of Multan on Wednesday.[8]

International Relations

• Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh briefly met with Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani during the nuclear summit in Seoul on Tuesday. According to the Indian Foreign Secretary, Singh and Gilani had a “very good meeting,” and Singh said he “plans to visit Pakistan” and “wants to make some concrete developments in the India-Pakistan relationship.” Speaking to an Indian news agency after the meeting, Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar emphasized that both countries recognized “the need to go beyond the stage of dealing with the ‘trust deficit’ and move towards a ‘result-oriented dialogue.’” Khar said that it was fortunate that both Pakistani and Indian leaders were “committed to taking the bilateral relationship forward through dialogue,” but she added that “the people of both countries need to have the confidence that this dialogue will help Pakistan and India resolve their issues.”[9]

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 31, February 6, 2012

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal ASSESSMENT PAKISTAN Print Balochistan: An Addiction to Murder Ajai Sahni, Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management & SATP Tushar Ranjan Mohanty Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management Zamur Domki (34), the wife, and Jaana Domki (13), the daughter of the Balochistan Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA) Mir Bakhtiar Domki, were shot dead near Gizri flyover of Karachi on January 31, 2012. The driver of their vehicle was also killed. Zamur and Jaana were also the sister and niece, respectively, of Baloch Republican Party (BRP) leader Brahamdagh Khan Bugti, and the granddaughter and great-granddaughter of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, one time Governor and Chief Minister of Balochistan, a former Federal Minister of State for the Interior, and eventual rebel leader, who was killed in a military operation in August 2006 , by then President Pervez Musharraf’s regime. According to the eyewitness account of a helper’s 12 year old daughter, who was also in the vehicle, but whose life was spared, the incident occurred a short distance from the residence of Zamur Domki’s maternal uncle in the exclusive and heavily policed Clifton area, with a Police unit “spectating (sic) from a distance”. The Baloch nationalist website Balochwarna records, Between 1 and 1:30 AM on the 31st of January, shortly after leaving the uncle’s house, a black coloured car intercepted Bugti’s car near Gizri Bridge, Clifton. A man dressed in black shalwar kameez and wearing a black face mask jumped out of the car and shot the driver, Barkat Baloch, as they tried to get away. The driver was killed on the spot as a result of multiple bullet wounds to the head. Then the assailant opened the rear door at which point two bikes arrived at the scene and parked on the left and right side of the car. Upon opening the door, Zamur Bugti offered her jewellery, phone and valuables to the man, thinking that he was a robber. In response the killer told Zamur that he didn’t need her valuables and that he was there to kill her and her daughter, in urdu. Zamur Bugti told him to spare her daughter and that he could kill her. At this point the killer went to the daughter who was sitting on the front passenger seat and fired multiple shots at her, hitting her in the chest and neck. Zamur Bugti was made to witness the brutal killing of her daughter. Zamur Bugti was then shot over a dozen times in the head, face and neck at point blank range and was left in a pool of blood. During this incident, the police were spectating from a distance. These ‘target killings’ have all the characteristics of a political assassination by Pakistan’s security and intelligence agencies, in a long succession of what have come to be known as “kill and dump” operations targeting Baloch rebels, dissidents, and their families, both within and outside Balochistan. Commentators have noted that their apparent intent was to send a “chilling message” to Brahamdagh Bugti, currently living in exile in Geneva. Pakistani efforts to secure Brahamdagh’s extradition have recently failed. Qadeer Baloch, Vice President of Voice for Baloch Missing Persons, claims that as many as 14,362 people, including 150 women, had ‘disappeared’ in Balochistan since 2001, and at least 370 mutilated bodies had been recovered from different parts of the Province since the latest cycle of insurgency broke out in 2004. Giving far more conservative estimates of confirmed disappearances, Zohra Yusuf, Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), a non-government body, notes, “It is a matter of grave alarm that 107 new cases of enforced disappearance have been reported in Balochistan in 2011, and the ‘missing persons’ are increasingly turning up dead.” The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) had estimated the number of executions of ‘disappeared’ persons at 270 in just six months, between July and December 2010. The disappearances and killings are widely believed to be orchestrated by Pakistan’s security and intelligence agencies, particularly including the Frontier Corps (FC) and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), or by their proxies, prominently including the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Aman Balochistan (TNAB, Movement for the Restoration of Peace, Balochistan). According to AHRC, TNAB had confessed to the killing of many Baloch nationalists, and had also announced its intention to kill another 35 on its hit list. TNAB is said to be the armed wing of the Muttahida Mahaz Balochistan (United Front Balochistan), headed by Siraj Raisani, the brother of Balochistan Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani. TNAB has allegedly been formed by secret agencies, particularly by the ISI, to crush the Baloch nationalist movement. On November 5, 2011, TNAB had claimed responsibility for the killing of two abducted Baloch activists. Their bodies were recovered with marks of extreme torture, and bullet wounds to the head – a pattern widely seen in executions attributed to FC and intelligence agencies as well. TNAB had also declared they were holding another four people, who would be killed ‘soon’. Significantly, while the Federal Ministry of Interior released a list of 31 banned outfits on November 5, 2011, including six Baloch organisations, the TNAB was conspicuous by its absence from the list. Despite its public claims of abductions and executions, no action by security agencies against the TNAB is yet on record. Very significantly, news trickling out of Balochistan indicates that the Army intensified operations in the Bugti areas on January 31, 2012, precisely the date of the Domki killings. Ground operations, backed by helicopter gunships and fighter jets, were launched in Sui, Gopat, Pir Koh, Uch and adjacent areas. Initial reports confirm three deaths, including one woman, and ‘critical injuries’ to at least 15 Baloch villagers. In a statement on the operations, BRP central spokesman Mir Sher Mohammad Bugti, observed that, “occupying Forces (the Pakistan Army) have intensified military operations in Balochistan after the concerns expressed by the American State Department on genocide of the Baloch nation and human rights violations by occupying Forces in Balochistan.” He stated, further, that the Army had made certain areas of Balochistan, including Dera Bugti and Kohlu, no-go zones for the media and human rights organizations. On January 15, 2012, Victoria Nuland, the US State Department Spokesperson, had stated, “The US is deeply concerned about the ongoing violence in Balochistan, especially targeted killings, disappearances and other human rights abuses… This is a complex issue. We strongly believe that the best way forward is for all the parties to resolve their differences through peaceful dialogue… And we also urge them to really lead and conduct a dialogue that takes this issue forward.” Earlier, in April 2011, when reports of Army operations in Dera Bugti trickled out into the media, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani had stated, on April 18, 2011, that troops in Balochistan would return to barracks “soon”, and no operation would be carried out in the Province without the permission of the Provincial Government. Kayani had claimed that not even a single Army unit was conducting any operations in Balochistan, adding that just two battalions were ‘present’ in the Sui area of the Province. Chief Minister Raisani, on May 5, 2011, had gone even further, to claim that there were no Army troops or tanks present in the Province. The truth is hard to come by in Balochistan, with one of the most repressive media regimes imposed by the state, its covert agencies, and its armed non-state proxies. On January 25, 2012, senior journalists at the Quetta Press Club described Balochistan as the ‘second most dangerous place’ on earth, after Afghanistan, for journalists. Earlier on November 26, 2011, the Baloch Muttahida Diffah Army (BMDA), an ISI-backed front outfit, issued a hit list of four journalists – Abdullah Kidrani, Abdullah Shawani, Munir Noor and Abdul Haq – from the Khuzdar District, and declared that they would soon be ‘targeted’. Mir Jang Baloch, BMDA spokesman, stated that journalists who were working as informers of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Republican Army (BRA) and other separatist groups would be punished. Subsequently, the Khuzdar Press Club had announced that all journalists of the Khuzdar District would suspend their “professional duties” for an indefinite period, commencing November 27, 2011, which is still on till date. The threat extends beyond media professionals to all groups seeking to uncover state excesses. The Human Rights Watch World Report 2012 notes, Since the beginning of 2011, human rights activists and academics critical of the military have also been killed in the Province. They include Siddique Eido, a coordinator for the nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP); Saba Dashtiyari, a professor at the University of Balochistan and an acclaimed Baloch writer and poet; and Baloch politician Abdul Salam… . Unsurprisingly, there is little expectation that the truth of the latest high profile assassinations will ever see the light, and establishment statements are already muddying the waters, suggesting that the killings were a part of a family blood feud, or of tribal rivalries. Pakistan’s Minister for the Interior, Rehman Malik, has sought to blame ‘foreign agencies’ and a ‘conspiracy against the country’, claiming, “Whenever we head towards positive development in Balochistan such things start happening.” A Joint Investigation Team, headed by an Inspector General of Police, has been established to look into what Interior Minister Malik concedes, is “not an ordinary incident”. Further, the National Assembly’s (NA’s) Standing Committee on Defence has summoned the country’s various intelligence agencies to give an in camera briefing on the incident and on the “poor security situation” in Balochistan, on February 29.

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments & Briefings

Volume 10, No. 27, January 9, 2012

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal

ASSESSMENT

• PAKISTAN: Blind Spot in FATA – Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
• INDIA: Andhra Pradesh: A Deepening Calm – Fakir Mohan Pradhan
• INDIA: Tripura: Mopping Up – Giriraj Bhattacharjee

PAKISTAN

Blind Spot in FATA
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Pakistani authorities had been flaunting their success in forging a ‘peace accord’ among various factions of the Taliban at a Shura-e-Muraqba (Council for Protection), a joint five-member council formed by the Afghan Taliban and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), along with other Pakistani militant outfits, on January 2, 2012. The establishment claimed that the TTP had agreed to end attacks against Pakistani Security Forces (SFs). Afghan Taliban ‘commander’ Mullah Mohammad Omar had put pressure on militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan to form the new grouping to end targeting of Pakistani SFs and, instead, to focus attention on United States (US)-led troops in Afghanistan.  Later, all Jihadi (holy war) groups, in consultation with Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the shadow Taliban Government for Afghanistan) decided to set up a committee to resolve differences among various factions and step up support for the war against Western forces in Afghanistan. A statement issued in the form of a pamphlet to the media in Waziristan after the meeting declared, “All Mujahideen — local and foreigners — are informed that all jihadi forces, in consultation with Islamic Emirate Afghanistan, have unanimously decided to form a five-member commission. It will be known as Shura-e-Muraqba.”

 

Image via Wikipedia

 

Dissent was, however, quickly in evidence, as the TTP declared that, while it would end attacks against civilian targets in Pakistan, its campaign against the Pakistani SFs would continue. The day after the Shura-e-Muraqba deal, TTP spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan told the media, “Yes, we signed an accord with three other major Taliban groups of Maulvi Nazeer, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and an Afghan Taliban faction, to avoid killing of innocent people and kidnapping for ransom, but we did not agree with them to stop suicide attacks and our fight against Pakistani Security Forces.” He added, further, “for us, Pakistan is as important as Afghanistan and, therefore, we cannot stop our activities here.”

Lest any ambiguity remained regarding their intentions, on January 5, 2012, TTP militants executed 15 Frontier Constabulary (FC) personnel in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan Agency (NWA) in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on January 5, 2012. The bullet-ridden bodies, thrown on a hill in the Mir Ali Sub-district, were spotted by tribesmen in the morning. The victims, who had been guarding the boundary between FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), had been taken hostage on December 23, 2011, in a pre-dawn attack by TTP militants on their post in Mullazai area of Tank District in KP.

North Korea from 30,000 feet | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

By Niko Milonopoulos, Siegfried S. Hecker, and Robert Carlin | 6 January 2012

Article Highlights

In the January/February issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Siegfried S. Hecker and Robert Carlin assessed North Korea‘s nuclear developments in 2011. That assessment preceded the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17. This article supplements the Hecker/Carlin piece with detailed overhead imagery, additional analysis of Pyongyang’s march toward a more threatening nuclear weapons capability, and brief commentary on how the accession of Kim Jong-un to leadership may influence North Korea’s nuclear trajectory.

The first publicly available overhead imagery that suggested North Korea was constructing a new nuclear reactor at its Yongbyon complex appeared on November 4, 2010. Charles L. Pritchard, a former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea and the president of the Korea Economic Institute, along with a delegation from the institute provided the first confirmation of this construction after a visit to Yongbyon that week. The following week, Yongbyon officials told PDF Stanford University’s John W. Lewis and two authors of this article (Hecker and Carlin) that the reactor was designed to be an experimental pressurized light water reactor (100 megawatts thermal, or 25-30 megawatts electric) to be fueled with low-enriched uranium fuel produced in a newly constructed centrifuge plant at the nearby Yongbyon fuel fabrication plant. The new reactor is being constructed on the former site of a cooling tower for a now-disabled, 5-megawatt electric, gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor that had been used to produce plutonium; the tower was demolished in 2008 as a step toward an eventual denuclearization agreement.

The Yongbyon construction site that Pritchard, Hecker, Carlin, and Lewis saw was essentially at the stage of development captured in the overhead image in Figure 1. The foundation slab had been poured, and the steel-reinforced concrete containment structure was about one meter high, on its way to a final height of 40 meters. Additional excavation was visible along with the construction of several new buildings that looked like storage sheds.

Figure 1

Overhead image that provided the first evidence of the construction
of a new reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

Overhead imagery tracks construction progress during the past year — from September 26, 2010, to November 3, 2011 — as shown in Figure 2. Early images indicated that the construction of this new light water reactor began in late September 2010, near the site of the destroyed cooling tower.

Figure 2

A time sequence of overhead images of the light water reactor
site tracking its development from September 2010 to November 2011.

The images show the rapid rate of construction of the reactor’s exterior, including the development of the reactor containment structure and the adjacent turbine generator hall. As the photos indicate, not much progress was made between December 2010 and April 2011, likely because of the harsh North Korean winter.

The September 23, 2011, annotated image shown in Figure 3 demonstrates that much has been done since May. The dashed lines represent underground cooling pipes running from a newly constructed pump house to the Kuryong River (as seen in a May 22 overhead not shown here). The reactor building containment dome is partially complete, and construction has begun on the turbine generator hall. Construction trucks can be seen in the right-hand corner of the image. On the north side of the reactor is the skeleton of a structure for transferring equipment into the reactor hall during annual maintenance outages.

Figure 3

Annotated diagram of the new reactor site, shown in a photo indicating
significant progress in construction.

The latest available close-up overhead image, taken on November 14, 2011 (Figure 4), shows that many of the reactor’s external components are almost complete. Much progress has been made on the turbine generator hall; a traveling crane rail is already visible. The structure of the turbine pedestal inside the turbine building is already apparent. This is significant; it indicates that North Korea has a turbine design and possibly the ability to manufacture a turbine generator set that will fit within the dimensions of the turbine pedestal now under construction. The reactor building containment dome on the east side of the reactor’s containment structure is complete and will be placed on top of the containment structure once the large internal components of the reactor’s core have been inserted. For the first time, we see the appearance of small cylindrical components near the dome; these are likely parts of the pressure vessel that will go inside the containment structure.

Figure 4

Close-up overhead image of the new reactor site. This is the most
up-to-date image publicly available.

Using overhead images from Figure 4, we constructed a 3-D model (Figure 5) of the light water reactor using the open-source program Google Sketchup. Based on the model, it is obvious that the reactor’s exterior is almost complete. The model also provides perspective on the size of the reactor, which will be 40 meters tall when completed and stretch 20 meters in diameter.

Figure 5

Three-dimensional model of the light water reactor based on the
latest satellite images.

Our analysis confirms Pyongyang’s plan to use this experimental reactor for electricity production. The rapid progress of construction also demonstrates that North Korea still has impressive manufacturing capabilities, in spite of the last two decades of economic downturn. However, we view this progress with alarm. Was the seismic analysis of the reactor site sufficiently rigorous? Did the regulatory authorities have the skills and independence required to license this reactor in such a short time period? And do Yongbyon specialists have sufficient experience with the very demanding materials requirements for the internal reactor components, including the pressure vessel, steam generator, piping, and fuel-cladding materials?