What to Expect From Mexico’s Election

Enrique Peña Nieto, político mexicano. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Interviewee: Shannon K. O’Neil, Douglas Dillon Fellow for Latin America Studies

Interviewer: Brianna Lee, Production Editor June 29, 2012

Mexicans head to the polls on July 1 to vote in a presidential election that looks likely to return to power the centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ran the government from 1929 to 2000. Polls show PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto in a wide lead over rivals Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador of the leftist Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) and Josefina Vazquez Mota of the center-right National Action Party (PAN), despite the emergence of the “YoSoy132″ student movement that has rallied against the PRI’s legacy of corruption. Peña Nieto’s “rhetoric is that he is from a different generation, it’s a different PRI,” says CFR Mexico expert Shannon K. O’Neil, but, she says, “it’s hard to tell.” The new president will need to accelerate the economy’s “stable but fairly slow growth” and will inherit a violent drug war that has led to increasing insecurity for Mexicans, O’Neil says. On combating the drug cartels, she says that “the focus will probably change, but the actual policies implemented will see a lot of continuity.”

Is it a foregone conclusion that Enrique Peña Nieto is going to win, or is there still room for surprises?

It’s becoming increasingly hard to imagine a scenario where he doesn’t win. There is still, depending on the polls, roughly 15 percent of the population that says they’re undecided, and for most polls that would be enough of a percentage to change the results, assuming that that whole 15 percent didn’t go to Peña Nieto, but that’s kind of a large assumption.

The Failure of the Moscow Talks – What’s Next?

 

Cascades of gas centrifuges are used to enrich uranium ore to concentrate its fissionable isotopes. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

INSS Insight – Asculai, Ephraim: The Istanbul-Baghdad-Moscow talks on Iran’s nuclear program are over. As expected, they did not achieve anything of significance, besides deciding on further, lower level talks. Indeed, the P5 1 and the Iranian delegations shared one objective: they did not want the process to end, thereby necessitating a decision on different tracks. The Iranians are successfully playing for time, as they have done for so many years, and the members of the P5 1 group are also trying to delay any inconvenient decisions, each group member for its own reasons. Most noticeably, the US delegation would like to postpone any major decision until after the November 2012 presidential elections. For their part, the Iranians need time to advance their nuclear program and produce as much enriched uranium as possible. Although according to many reports the sanctions are hurting Iran, they are still not hurting Iran badly enough, and the Iranians are able to bear them.

The ultimate aims of both sides are, of course, diametrically opposite. The Iranians want to retain the capability to enrich uranium to military-grade levels and to gain the ability to produce several nuclear weapons in short order, should the Islamic Republic’s authorities so decide. The Iranian strategy is very simple: they want the world to recognize the legitimacy of the Iranian uranium enrichment program. Even under limited conditions, such recognition would enable Iran to retain its technical capabilities, to perfect the enrichment process, and to leave them a potential for a breakout (defined as the start of the process to produce military-grade enriched uranium), whenever they decide to do so. In addition, the Iranians could well construct concealed facilities and secretly produce enriched uranium to whatever levels they choose to achieve.

The P5 1 want to prevent this possibility, but their remaining options are few. It is nearly impossible to envision the Security Council taking any further action against Iran, because Russia and China would likely vote against it. The first and most probable option for the West (the P5 1 minus Russia and China) is to impose the July sanctions on oil and hope for the best. The next option is to increase the sanctions considerably and wait for the Iranians to blink. The third option is military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

What would the Iranians do? Although the present sanctions have hurt Iran considerably, there are those who think that Iran can shoulder them indefinitely and will therefore continue with its present tactics of preventing a showdown while enriching uranium.

Gangsters, Islamic Terrorists, Deathmatch

English: The Muslim population of the world map by percentage of each country, according to the Pew Forum 2009 report on world Muslim populations. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

June 17, 2012: The continuing violence in the Moslem south has led to 5,000 dead and 8,000 wounded in the last eight years. But it has also led to over 200,000 people leaving the area. Most of those fleeing have been Moslem. About 30 percent of the Buddhists in the south (who were 20 percent of the population in 2004) have fled and ten percent of the Moslems. Criminal gangs, whose main business is smuggling drugs and other contraband from Malaysia, have long dominated the area. The gangs agreed to support the Islamic terrorists, since both groups had something to gain by trying to weaken law and order in the area. While the gangs made it more difficult to improve the economy, they were more tolerable than the Islamic terrorists. All this has become too much for most Moslems. The Islamic terrorists wanted to expel all non-Moslems, shut down secular schools, and didn’t care if they made it difficult to improve the economy. This was too much for most of the Moslems the Islamic terrorists were supposed to be representing. Those that don’t flee are increasingly joining pro-government armed defense groups. The gangs and Islamic terror groups refuse to negotiate or quit, so it’s a fight to the death. The gangs will probably turn on their Islamic radical allies eventually, as the criminal organizations are not run by religious fanatics but business-minded entrepreneurs who are not keen on getting wiped out. Then again, the gangsters believe that the Islamic radicals will have to be killed, otherwise the southern gangsters will have some pretty deadly and determined enemies in their own backyard.

The future of the Arab Spring: Islam, Islamism, growing paranoia and future prospects – Part II

English: Map showing the territorial four main races/ethnicities/colors of South Africa in 1979: Whites, Coloureds, Blacks and Indians. The gray areas indicate the Apartheid-era Bantustans, which are almost exclusively black. This map is a photoshopped version of the CIA-made original map at Perry Castañeda map collection at the University of Texas website. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Written by Raeesah Cassim Cachalia (1)

Part I of this discussion explored the paranoia around the growth of political Islam after the Arab Spring. The discussion explained many of the issues involving Islam and Islamophobia and where these issues stem from. Continuing from this, part II briefly examines democracy as well as the Islamic state and explains why democracy, as we know it today, should not be the only option considered for regime change in Arab Spring nations.

The flaws and fallacies of democracy

Democracy needs to be evaluated as more than a theoretical ideal but in light of its implementation and track record as well. This is because freedom and justice, among the other values which democracy is meant to entail, do not merely exist in the right to vote or in the existence of a peoples’ constitution. Democracy, at its core, is a system meant for the benefit of the masses. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu said: “…freedom translates into having a supply of clean water, having electricity on tap; being  able to live in a decent home and have a good job; to be able to send your children to school and to have accessible health care. I mean, what’s the point of having made this transition [to democracy] if the quality of life of these people is not enhanced and improved? If not, the vote is useless.”(2) South Africa, despite having come a long way from its Apartheid past, is an example of the distance between democracy in theory and practice.

The past six months have seen a number of South African citizens worked up into a frenzy over Government attempts to impose toll tariffs for the use of major public roads. Government claims the tariff is necessary to cover a large ZAR 20 billion (US$ 2.6 billion) debt accrued for various road projects. In considering why the regular national budget does not cover such expenses, many angrily point to Government corruption along with gross wastage of state expenditure by South African politicians. To name but one example, that of former Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Sicelo Shiceka, we may look at the following official findings regarding the former Minister’s expenditure of state, and thus taxpayers, money in 2011 (keeping in mind that poverty rates are as high as 64% in parts of South Africa with these parts of the population living on less than ZAR 10 (US$ 1) a day):

• ZAR 546,864 (US$ 71,687) for a personal trip to Switzerland under the pretence of official Government work.
• ZAR 640,000 (US$ 83,920) in one year spent by the Minister and his immediate staff on one of South Africa’s most costly hotels.
• ZAR 55,793 (US$ 7,300) for a one night stay for the Minister and a private acquaintance in the same hotel.
• ZAR 160,000 (US$ 20,975) in eight months for flights for the Minister’s family members (including an “estranged wife and current girlfriend”).(3)

South Africa may be a relatively new democracy, but even established democracies indicate the illusions of this system.

Gulf of Aden Security Review – June 12, 2012

Jaar-sm (Photo credit: Julian Stallabrass)

Yemen: Yemen military recaptures Jaar and Zinjibar; interview with AQAP military spokesman features details on May 21 suicide attack, battle for Abyan; findings from May 21 suicide attack in Sana’a to be released next week

Horn of Africa: TFG, Kenyan troops clash with al Shabaab near Qoqani; al Shabaab recaptures Mahas from Ahlu Sunna and Ethiopian forces; al Shabaab arrests four people in Elbur; Somali peacemaker in Beledweyne assassinated; Kenya asks for financial assistance from U.S. ahead of assault on al Shabaab’s stronghold in Kismayo; newly trained TFG soldiers arrive to Beledweyne

Yemen Security Brief

• Yemen’s commander of the southern military zone General Salem Qatan reported that the former Ansar al Sharia strongholds of Zinjibar and Jaar in Abyan governorate have been “completely cleansed.” The Yemeni Defense Ministry said that the Yemeni military, backed by armed tribesmen, entered Zinjibar and Jaar where they clashed with Ansar al Sharia militants. At least 20 militants, four soldiers, and two civilians were killed in the attack. Twenty more Yemeni soldiers were also injured. The Defense Ministry added that between 200 and 300 Ansar al Sharia militants, including foreign fighters, fled from Jaar, Zinjibar, and Shaqra. Residents in Jaar reported that militants left behind flyers stating that Ansar al Sharia did not want to “cause any harm to Jaar and its inhabitants.” Additionally, the Yemeni Navy reportedly sunk 10 boats carrying Ansar al Sharia militants.[1]

• In an interview with al Quds al Arabi released on June 12, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) military commander Qasim al Raymi provided details on Sana’a’s May 21 suicide attack. When asked why AQAP targeted Yemeni troops when it claims it is at war with the U.S., Raymi explained that the attack was in retaliation for the Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s campaign against militants in Abyan and demonstrates AQAP’s ability to “bring the attack to them.” He added that the battle for Abyan will continue for years.[2]

• Yemeni Interior Minister Abdul Qadir Qahtan announced on June 11 that the findings from the investigation of the May 21 Sana’a suicide bombing will be released next week. The attack claimed by AQAP killed over 100 Yemeni soldiers.[3]

Horn of Africa Security Brief

• Local residents reported that Transitional Federal Government (TFG) soldiers, backed by Kenyan troops, clashed with al Shabaab militants near Qoqani in Lower Jubba region. Reports on casualties and injuries have yet to surface.[4]

• Al Shabaab militants recaptured the town of Mahas in Hiraan region on June 11, reported locals. TFG and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a forces withdrew before al Shabaab fighters arrived. Ahlu Sunna official Saney Mohamud Farah stated that the town fell to the militants due to the increased pressure felt from the growing presence of al Shabaab militants on the outskirts of Mahas.[5]

Yemen Crisis Situation Reports: Update 140

Yemeni officials claim that security forces have made significant gains against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) insurgent arm, Ansar al Sharia, in south Yemen. The insurgency began quietly last March, and by early summer, Ansar al Sharia threatened the port city of Aden. Regaining control over the territory held by Ansar al Sharia will begin to reduce AQAP’s sanctuary in Yemen.

Yemen claims to have recaptured territory in and around Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan governorate, after weeks of intense fighting. Mohammed Albasha, Yemen’s embassy spokesman in Washington D.C., announced in an emailed statement that the army entered the center of Jaar, north of Zinjibar, this morning, and that troops have control of the Governor’s mansion in Zinjibar. The mansion appeared last spring in militant footage documenting Ansar al Sharia’s seizure of Zinjibar. Yemeni troops have been positioned in Abyan and Shabwah governorates to pursue Ansar al Sharia militants and are set to begin an operation to secure ‘Azzan in Shabwah, a militant stronghold. The commander of Yemen’s southern military zone Major General Salem Ali Qatan claimed that Ansar al Sharia suffered “heavy losses” while only four Yemeni soldiers were killed. Control of Zinjibar and Jaar will give the Yemeni military control over the main artery into Aden.

The Republican Guard’s 3rd Armored Brigade accepted the appointment of a new commander after a two-month standoff. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed Brigadier General Abdul Rahman Abdullah al Halili commander of the brigade on April 6, replacing Brigadier General Mohammed Qaid Saleh al Hathifi.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed credit for two suicide attacks on al Houthi targets. A suicide car bombing in Hazm, the capital of al Jawf governorate, reportedly killed 13 supporters of the al Houthi movement on May 25. The al Houthis also reported a failed suicide bombing in Sa’ada city the same day. Clashes between al Houthi rebels and Salafist fighters broke out June 3 in Sa’ada’s Kataf district, killing over thirty people. Separately, the al Houthis have announced that they will participate in Yemen’s upcoming National Dialogue.

After Failed Demobilization, ERPAC Factions Join Colombia’s Larger War

Some 267 members of the Popular Revolutionary Anti-Terrorist Army of Colombia (ERPAC) surrendered in December, led by Jose Eberto Lopez, alias “Caracho.” Colombian officials were caught off guard, unprepared to process them legally, so the vast majority were released hours after they turned themselves in.

About 80 percent of them have since been recaptured, but most are facing charges no more serious than criminal conspiracy, which carries sentences between eight and 18 years, despite the fact that Caracho and his group could be responsible for 1,200 murders in three Colombian provinces. Because most have confessed to lesser crimes, their sentences could be halved.

On May 30, 43 members of the ERPAC were sentenced to four years and five months in prison and ordered to pay a fine of 900 million pesos (about $500,000) each, after pleading guilty to criminal conspiracy. Other similar convictions are expected to follow.

When Caracho, who presented himself as the ERPAC’s top leader following the 2010 death of Pedro Oliverio Guerrero, alias “Cuchillo,” offered to demobilize with his men, he was seeking the same benefits that had been granted to paramilitary fighters under the Justice and Peace process. This offered suspended sentences, monthly stipends and vocational training to the rank and file. But the government of Juan Manuel Santos declared that its policy for the new illegal armed groups that emerged after the paramilitary demobilizations between 2003 and 2006, such as the ERPAC, was to deal with them solely through the courts, without offering any benefits for laying down their arms.

This means that many of the convicts, disgruntled by the lack of benefits, and who could actually be released from prison before serving their full sentences, with time off for good behavior and studies, may be prime candidates to return to the ranks of the remaining ERPAC factions.

In fact, the men who demobilized with Caracho apparently represent only a fraction of the total fighting force of the ERPAC. The remaining estimated 560 members have split into two groups: the Meta Bloc and Libertadores de Vichada, according to a report by the International Crisis Group (see pdf, below).

The Meta Bloc, according to the report, is led by Rubber Antonio Navarro Caicedo, who goes by the alias “Flaco Fredy” and operates mainly in the Ariari area of Meta province. The Libertadores del Vichada, which operates in Cumaribo, Vichada and parts of northern Meta along the border to Casanare, is led by Martin Farfan, alias Pijarbey, who was Cuchillo’s second-in-command until his capture in 2009. Pijarbey served three years of his four-year sentence before returning to the Llanos at the beginning of this year to take up leadership of the ERPAC faction.

Abu Yahya al-Libi – Dead or Live? | Jih@d

by Florian Flade

New Abu Yahya al-Libi video announced

While Western media and numerous news agencies are citing U.S. intelligence sources saying a recent CIA drone strike in North Waziristan killed Al-Qaida commander Abu Yahya al-Libi, there is no word from the Jihadi side yet on wether these claims are true or not.

Yesterday there was an announcement released on several major Jihadi Internet forums indicating Abu Yahya was in fact not killed and is still roaming the mountains of the Pakistani tribal area.

“Glad Tidings: New As-Sahab Video of Abu Yahya al-Libi (may Allah protect him) will be released soon” – the forums post reads.

Does this announcement made by a forum member mean the Al-Qaida commander survived the U.S. drone attack or was in fact never in the house that was hit by the missiles? No, it does not. In the past Online Jihadis have reacted in a similar way when a prominent Al-Qaida figure was killed. Within the intelligence community there is a saying: “First they deny it, then they mourn it, then they celebrate it, then they call for revenge”.

Somalis Say US Rewards Will Help End ‘Reign of Terror’ By Al Qaeda Offshoot

 

The U.S. government is offering $33 million for information leading to the capture of seven of Somali al Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab‘s top leaders, including $7 million for founder Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohamed, also known as Abu Zubeir or Godane, and $5 million apiece for Mukhtar Robow (left) and Mohamed Khalaf. (Rewards for Justice)

By MOHAMED IBRAHIM

June 9, 2012

The Somali government and Somali observers say the new $33 million U.S. bounty on the heads of seven al Shabaab leaders may be just what is needed to help crush the al Qaeda affiliate, which is already reeling from military assaults on all sides and from the air.

“The announcement from the U.S. government . . . will certainly help the Somali government’s efforts to end al Qaeda’s reign of terror in Somalia,” said Somalia’s transitional government in a statement Thursday. “This is an important juncture in Somali history, where the possibility of full recovery from years of chaos is within reach.”

Through its Rewards for Justice program, the State Department this week offered $7 million for information leading to the capture of al-Shabaab founder and commander Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed, AKA Godane or Mukhtar Abu Zubeir, $5 million apiece for four other Shabaab leaders and $3 million a head for two more. By comparison, the U.S. had offered only $1 million for Abu Yahya al-Libi, who was killed in a U.S. strike in Pakistan on Monday and was described by U.S. officials as a bin Laden confidante al Qaeda’s second-in-command.

Officials Watch for Body Bombs on Planes Watch Video

Germany reveals secret techie soldier unit, new cyberweapons

Main building of the University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder). (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

We have ways of making you pwned

By John Leyden • Get more from this author  8th June 2012 11:29 GMT

CyCon 2012 Germany has confirmed that its military maintains an operational cyberwarfare unit with offensive capabilities.

The admission, which appeared in parliamentary documents published on Tuesday, gave no details of the size of the unit much less any operations that it might have run. However documents delivered to the German federal defence committee did reveal that the unit has been operating for six years since 2006, a year before the cyber-attack on Estonia and four years before the discovery of the infamous Stuxnet worm.

http://ds.serving-sys.com/BurstingRes/Site-27237/Type-2/e53ce8c1-9790-4f5e-b89e-03b2539b45a7.swf“The initial capacity to operate in hostile networks has been achieved,” the papers explain, adding that the Computer Network Operations Unit had carried out “simulations” of attacks in a “closed laboratory environment”, German press agency DPA reports.

The unit reports to the joint forces strategic intelligence command. Legislators reportedly expressed surprise at the existence of the unit and questioned whether military commanders had the legal authority to launch attacks on foreign networks.

Prof Dr Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, a professor of law at European University Viadrina Frankfurt in Germany, told El Reg that the armed forces of many nations are probably building up an offensive cyber capability. The only difference is that Germany and (also recently) the Obama administration is the US are publicly talking about it.

“The German MoD see a potential in having an offensive cyber-op capability as well as an ability to defend critical infrastructures”, most notably military systems, Dr Heintschel von Heinegg explained.